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TORT LAW-TORT IMMUNITY FORNON-PROFITS--IS THE CHARITABLE
IMMUNITY DEFENSE BECOMING AN OFFENSE FOR ARKANSAS HOSPITALS?
George v. Jefferson HospitalAss 'n, 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999).
I. INTRODUCTION
Charity is No Substitute for Justice Withheld.'
In George v. Jefferson Hospital Ass 'n,2 the Arkansas Supreme Court
examined the controversial doctrine of charitable immunity. The case focused
on the applicability of the charitable immunity defense to Jefferson Regional
Memorial Hospital in a medical malpractice action.3 The court, for the first
time, applied the recently adopted test for the charitable immunity defense to
a hospital.4
On appeal, the court examined two separate issues: first, whether the
trial court erred by issuing summary judgment on the issue of charitable
immunity in favor of Jefferson Regional Medical Center, and second, whether
the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's relation back claim on the statute of
limitations against the insurance carrier.5 The court affirmed both decisions,
allowing the summary judgment to stand on both issues.6
This note first discusses facts that led to the decision in George. Next,
it traces the background of the charitable immunity doctrine in majority
jurisdictions and in Arkansas, a minority-view state. Part III also reviews the
test adopted in Masterson v. Stambuck7 for the charitable immunity defense
and its application to this case. Part IV then examines in detail the reasoning
behind the court's decision. Finally, this note discusses the impact of broadly
applying the Masterson test, and the resulting extension of the charitable
immunity defense through this application.
1. See St. Augustine, quoted in BARNEs & NOBLE BOOK OF QUOTATIONs 196 (Robert I.
Fitzgerald ed., 1986).
2. 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999).
3. See George, 337 Ark. at 209, 987 S.W.2d at 711.
4. See id at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714. For a discussion of the new test for the charitable
immunity defense, see infra Part III, B.
5. See George, 337 Ark. at 209, 987 S.W.2d at 713.
6. See id, 987 S.W.2d at 713.
7. 321 Ark. 391, 902 S.W.2d 803 (1995).
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II. FACTS
On August 31, 1994, Gina George was admitted to Jefferson Regional
Medical Center' to give birth to her child.9 The following day, Dr. Reid G.
Pierce performed a Cesarean section on Ms. George in the hospital.'I Ms.
George then sought medication to suppress her breast milk production for
which Dr. Pierce prescribed Parlodel.Y Ms. George continued taking Parlodel
after her discharge and was subsequently rushed to the emergency room for
treatment of severe "seizure-like symptoms" on September 5, 1994.12
Parlodel's use by post-birth mothers has a turbulent history. The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) asked manufacturers to cease labeling
Parlodel and other Bromocriptines for use as a milk suppressant in 1989
following the FDA Fertility Advisory Committee findings which determined
that the drugs were unsafe for such use. 3 In 1994, the manufacturers agreed
with the FDA to cease marketing Bromocriptines entirely for use in milk
suppression after receiving numerous reports of strokes, seizures, and
myocardial infarctions that had occurred in post-birth women using the drug. 4
8. See George, 337 Ark. at 209, 987 S.W.2d at 711. The hospital, Jefferson Regional
Medical Center, will herein be referred to as JRMC.
9. See Brief for Appellant at 2, George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 337 Ark. 206, 987
S.W.2d 710 (1999) (No. 98-1134). JRMC is located in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, a town of
approximately 55,000 residents. See Pine Bluff, Arkansas, 22 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 113
(Int'l ed. 1995). The corporation, Jefferson Hospital Association, Inc., does business as
Jefferson Regional Medical Center. See George, 337 Ark. at 209, 987 S.W.2d at 711.
10. See Brief for Appellant at 2, George (No. 98-1134). Dr. Pierce performed a lower
transverse Cesarean section on Appellant which proceeded normally. See id.
11. See id. Parlodel is the brand name for the generic drug Bromocriptine. See
Bromocriptine Systematic, I DRUG INFORMATION FOR THE HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL 599
(18th ed. 1998). Bromocriptines inhibit the production of prolactin, a hormone which
stimulates milk production, helps regulate fertility, and stimulates the production of the
neurotransmitter dopamine, reducing the sluggish movements and rigidity of Parkinson's
disease. See id. at 599-600. Parlodel was initially manufactured by Sandoz Pharmaceuticals
which later merged with the Novartis Corporation. See Novartis - Who We Are (visited October
7, 1999) <http://www.novartis.com/textsite/weare/t-corpomerger.html>.
12. Brief of Appellant at 2, George (No. 98-1134).
13. See FDA Seeks Withdrawal of Indication for Suppressing Breast Milk, FDA NEWS
UPDATE (FDA Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs Advisory Committee Report), Sept. 27,
1989.
14. See Donald McLearn, FDA Moves to End Use ofBromocriptine for Postpartum Breast
Engorgement, FDA NEWS UPDATE (FDA Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs Advisory
Committee Report), Aug. 17, 1994. According to the FDA 31 women suffered strokes, 63
women reported seizures, and 7 women reported heart attacks, including at least 10 fatalities
related to the use of Bromocriptines for milk suppression. See Parlodel No Longer to Be Sold
for Lactation Suppression, FDA CONStMER, Nov. 1994, at 2-3. For the current status of
Parlodel and other Bromocriptines, see Estrogen for Postpartum Breast Engorgement;
Withdrawal of Approval of the Labeled Indication for Postpartum Breast Engorgement in
Estrogen-Containing Drug Products, 63 FED. REG. 69,631 (1998).
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On August 29, 1996, Ms. George filed a complaint against JRMC and Dr.
Pierce alleging medical malpractice for prescribing Parlodel5 and strict
liability in tort against Sandoz Pharmaceuticals.' 6  Ms. George failed,
however, to file suit against JRMC's insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co., until she amended her complaint in January 1998." Ms.
George argued that Jefferson Hospital Association was maintained as a for-
profit corporation and did not qualify for the charitable immunity defense."8
The trial court granted summary judgment for St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Company and JRMC, ruling that the hospital qualified for the
charitable immunity defense and was thus immune from tort liability, and that
the amended complaint did not "relate back" to include the insurance carrier,
St. Paul. 9 After the trial court granted summary judgment for JRMC, Ms.
George non-suited her claims against Sandoz Pharmaceuticals and Dr. Pierce
and pursued an appeal.2" The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that
the amended complaint failed to meet the Rule 15(c)'s requirements to relate-
back,2' and that fair-minded persons could not disagree that JRMC met the
requirements for the defense of charitable immunity.22
15. See George, 337 Ark. at 209, 987 S.W.2d at 711.
16. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 711. "Apparently, the medication had been withdrawn from
the market in mid-August 1994, but notice of the recall had not been given by the manufacturer,
Sandoz ... to doctors and hospitals, including the Defendants in this action, prior to its
prescription by Dr. Pierce to appellant." Id., 987 S.W.2d at 711.
17. See id. at 210, 987 S.W.2d at 712. The original complaint in this case was filed just
prior to the two year statute of limitations for medical malpractice. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 712.
"Except as otherwise provided in this section, all actions for medical injury shall be commenced
within two years after the cause of action accrues... [t]he date of the accrual of the cause of
action shall be the date of the wrongful act complained of and no other time. ... " ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-114-203(a), (b) (Michie 1997). The 1998 amendment to the complaint did not fall
within the statute of limitations unless the amendment "related back" to the original pleading
under Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 15(c). See George, 337 Ark. at 215,987 S.W.2d
at 715.
18. See Brief of the Appellee at vi, George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 337 Ark. 206, 987
S.W.2d 710 (1999) (No. 98-1134).
19. See George, 337 Ark. at 215,987 S.W.2d at 714. Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 15(c)'s relation back provisions required four things: (1) the claim must have arisen out
of conduct set forth in the original pleading; (2) St. Paul must have received notice of the
institution of the action that it would not be prejudiced in maintaining defense on the merits; (3)
St. Paul must have known, or should have known, that but for mistake concerning identity of
the proper party, the action would have been brought against it; and (4) the second and third
requirements must have been filled within 120 days from the date of the original complaint. See
ARK. R. Crv. P. 15(c). See also George, 337 Ark. at 215, 987 S.W.2d at 715.
20. See Brief for Appellant at vii, George (No. 98-1134).
21. See George, 337 Ark. at 216, 987 S.W.2d at 715. See also ARK. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
22. See George, 337 Ark. at 214,987 S.W.2d at 713. The plaintiff in this case could have
sued the insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire & Marine Co., directly in the original complaint. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210 (Michie 1997).
UALR LAW REVIEW
III. BACKGROUND
The George decision represents a distinct minority view of full charitable
immunity that can provide charities a complete immunity defense from tort
liability. Accordingly, the following section traces the development of the
doctrine of charitable immunity in both majority-view jurisdictions and in
Arkansas. First, this section discusses the development of the defense
generally, as well as its fall into disfavor in the majority of jurisdictions.
Second, it reviews the development of charitable immunity in Arkansas, and
the court's commitment to retaining the defense to protect Arkansas' charities.
A. Evolution of Charitable Immunity
1. Where It Began
Charitable immunity is viewed as an exception to the principle of
respondeat superior which states that corporations retain liability for harms
inflicted by their agents when the agents act within the scope of their duties.2"
The exception creates immunity for charities by refusing to hold them liable
in tort. The concept of immunity originated in England in case law that gave
favorable tort treatment to charitable organizations. 4 The early doctrine
simply stated that trustees were not liable for the negligent acts of their
employees because it defeated the purpose of a trust to use these monies for
tort judgments.25
Although England soon abandoned the doctrine, the states began to use
the charitable immunity defense to protect charities. A seminal step in the
states adopting charitable immunity occurred when the Massachusetts
23. See President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
24. See Developments in the Law - Nonprofit Corporations, Special Treatment and Tort
Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1692, n. 18 (1993) (discussing the inception of charitable
immunity in England in the case of Feoffees ofHeriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508, 1510
(1846)). See also Fordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550,
563, 96 S.W. 155, 160 (1906) (quoting Feoffees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508,
1509 (1846)). The Ross court explained its policy rationale as follows:
[It] is obvious that it would be a direct violation, in all cases, of the purpose of a
trust if this could be done, for there is not any person who ever created a trust that
provided for payment out of it for damages to be recovered from those who had the
management of the fund.... To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to
apply it to those objects which the author of the fund had in view, but would be to
divert it to a completely different purpose.
Id., 96 S.W. at 160.
25. See Holliday v. Parish of St. Leonard, 142 Eng. Rep. 769, 774 (1861).
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Supreme Court decided McDonaldv. Massachusetts General Hospital.26 This
decision reiterated that hospitals rely upon charitable donations from the
public trust, and that those funds should not be diverted from that purpose to
pay judgments.27 This policy rationale was easily embraced by other
jurisdictions seeking to protect hospitals whose sole purpose in the early days
consisted of treating poor patients, not paying patients.28 States adopting the
doctrine justified immunity for a variety of reasons, including that the use of
charitable funds was contrary to the charitable donor's intent,29 that a patient
in the care of a charity assumed the risk,3" or that because hospitals received
no profits from their employees' work, respondeat superior did not apply.3'
Of course, many courts also feared the bankruptcy of charitable groups from
tort judgments.32 The charitable immunity doctrine continued to expand to
other jurisdictions in the United States, and by the early 1940s, over forty
states accepted full charitable immunity as the prevailing view.33
2. A Short Stay at Grandma's House for the Immunity Defense
With drastic changes to hospitals' primary purposes and organization,
many of the jurisdictions that earlier embraced the doctrine of charitable
immunity began to chip away at it.34- Considered the first major blow, in 1942,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected charitable immunity
because of the availability of insurance to compensate plaintiffs.35 The
26. 120 Mass. 432 (1876), overruled in part by Colby v. Carney Hosp., 254 N.E.2d 407
(Mass. 1969). Interestingly, the English cases that created the doctrine were overruled before
the United States even began adopting charitable immunity. See Mersey Docks & Harbour Bd.
of Trustees v. Gibbs, 1 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866).
27. See McDonald, 120 Mass. at 436.
28. See Mark J. Garwin, Immunity in the Absence of Charity: EMTALA and the Eleventh
Amendment, 23 S. UIL. U. L.J. 1 (1998). The hospitals were generally funded by religious
organizations while the wealthy were treated at home by traveling physicians. See id. at 1.
29. See Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 78 A. 898, 899 (Me. 1910). For the law of
vicarious liability see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (Supp. 1999).
30. See Powers v. Massachusetts Homoepathic Hosp., 109 F. 294, 303 (1st Cir. 1901).
31. See, e.g., Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 33 A. 595, 604 (Conn. 1895).
32. See, e.g., Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 88 S.E. 649 (S.C. 1916).
33. See Bradley C. Canon & Dean Jaros, The Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine:
The Abrogation of Charitable Immunity, 13 L. & SOC'Y REV. 969, 971 (1979).
34. See Garwin, supra note 28, at 2.
35. See President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827-28 (D.C. Cir.
1942). Minnesota and New York repudiated the doctrine prior to the Georgetown decision. See
Note, The Quality of Mercy: 'Charitable Torts'and Their Continuing Immunity, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 1382, 1398 n.31 (1987) (citing Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 175




insurance exception36 to charitable immunity became the first of many
exceptions to full immunity, including an exception for negligently screening
servants37 and the exclusion of commercial funds from immunity.3" For
example, Georgia allowed recovery when a patient paid for services subject
to availability of non-charitable funds from the hospital. 9 Some states even
enacted statutes entirely eliminating the common-law doctrine.' Overall, the
charitable immunity defense became fragmented, varying widely state to state,
with each jurisdiction creating various exceptions and levels of
abandonment.4' Adding to the feverish abrogation in the majority of
jurisdictions, in 1977, the Restatement (Second) of Torts formally opposed
charitable immunity stating that a benevolent enterprise does not enjoy
immunity because of its charitable purpose.42
3. State of Disarray and New Concerns of Tort Liability
The numerous states that eliminated or restricted charitable immunity
began to deal with an increasing number of tort actions, particularly in the
area of health service organizations."3 Adding to the dilemma, the 1980s
produced a dramatic rise in insurance premiums that encouraged some states
to provide protection for charities." A number of states reacted by placing
36. See Georgetown, 130 F.2d at 827-28.
37. See, e.g., Old Folks' & Orphan Children's Home of Church v. Roberts, 171 N.E. 10,
12 (Ind. App. 1930) (allowing liability when a charity negligently screened servants).
38. See Lincoln Mem'l Univ. v. Sutton, 43 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tenn. 1931) (distinguishing
for-profit moneys from charitable funds). See also Morton v. Savannah Hosp., 96 S.E. 887, 888
(Ga. 1918) (allowing recovery from funds received from paying patients).
39. See Morton, 96 S.E. at 888.
40. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557(d) (West 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
539.9 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-26 (1956).
41. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 996 (4th ed. 1971) (proclaiming
charitable immunity in a state of full retreat and predicting the doctrine's eradication in
American law within twenty years). Six jurisdictions including Maryland, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Ohio, South Carolina, and Wyoming eliminated immunity for charitable hospitals but
allowed it to remain for other charities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E
reporter's note (1977).
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1977). "One engaged in a charitable,
educational, religious or benevolent enterprise or activity is not for that reason immune from
tort liability." Id.
43. See Canon & Jaros, supra note 33, at 976. "Suits against hospitals did, in fact,
increase dramatically following abrogation .... For example, there were five awards of over
$150,000 in Illinois shortly after abrogation." Canon & Jaros, supra note 33, at 976 (internal
citation omitted).
44. See Michael Pierce Singsen, Charity Is No Defense: The Impact of the Insurance
Crises on Nonprofit Organizations and an Examination ofAlternative Insurance Mechanisms,
22 U.S.F. L. REv. 599, 601-09 (1988) (discussing the impact of 1980's insurance crisis on
charities' ability to obtain insurance). See also Kenneth Reich, Youth Agencies Hit Hard by
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damage caps on awards against charities45 or limiting recovery to the amount
of insurance coverage.46 Other states, applying a novel approach, increased
charities' protection by requiring insurance companies to give long-term
notice of policy cancellations and prohibiting interim cancellations entirely
when insuring non-profit organizations.47
Another thorny issue arose whenjuries began awarding punitive damages
against charities, placing them in grave danger of financial ruin."8 For
example, in Texas, Goodwill Industries paid almost five million dollars to the
parents of a teenage daughter who was murdered by a parolee employed by the
company.49 Another scare occurred when the YMCA settled a suit for over
$831,000, plus lifetime monthly payments, when a young girl almost drowned
in its pool.5" Occasionally, a state has upheld punitive damages against
charities, but this remains a generally disfavored result for obvious reasons."
In recent years, most states have retained or reinitiated some type of
limited charitable immunity to protect charities. This preservation has
occurred in the form of protection statutes, damages caps, or other initiatives,
Soaring Insurance Costs, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1986, Part II, at 1; Insurance Increases Forces
YMCA to Drop Youth Minibike Program, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 14, 1986, at 5.
45. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85k (West Supp. 1999) (placing a limit at
$20,000 per occurrence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:17 (Lexis Supp. 1998) (limiting recovery
absent willful or wanton negligence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-55-210 (Law Co-op. 1990) (setting
damage cap of $200,000); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84.007(g) (West Supp. 1999)
(placing damage cap at $500,000 per person, $1,000,000 each incident of death or bodily injury,
and $100,000 each incident of damage to property). In jurisdictions allowing recovery, critics
began voicing concern over the state of affairs, particularly in regard to hospital liability. See
Claire Grandprd Combs, Comment, Hospital Vicarious Liability for the Negligence of
Independent Contractors and Staff Physicians: Criticisms of Ostensible Agency Doctrine in
Ohio, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 711 (1987). However, one critic chastised the damages cap in
Massachusetts as a remnant of the immunity doctrine that should have remained dead and
buried. See Paul T. O'Neill, Charitable Immunity: The Time to End Laissez-Faire Health Care
in Massachusetts Has Come, 82 MASS. L. REv. 223, 235 (1997).
46. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 158 (West 1980) (setting the amount of recovery
at the limit of a charity's insurance coverage).
47. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 35, at 1397.
48. See Daniel A. Barfield, Note, Better to Give Than to Receive: Should Nonprofit
Corporations and Charities Pay Punitive Damages?, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1193 (1995).
49. See Gary Taylor, Goodwill Must Pay $S5M in Murder by Parolee-Employee, NAT'L
L.J., June 8, 1987, at 22.
50. See David Rohn, YMCA, Pool Victim Settle; Girl Who Nearly Drowned to Get $4,000
a Month, WASH. POST, May 17, 1978, at A4. For other examples of high-profile cases involving
non-profits, see Lisa Green Markoff, A Volunteer's Thankless Task, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1988,
at 1.
51. See Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806, 809-10
(Minn. 1992) (allowing punitive damages against a church where a priest had molested a
parishioner); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 644 P.2d 577, 607-08 (Or.
1982) (allowing punitive damages to be assessed against a religious organization when it
defrauded a parishioner's assets).
1999]
UALR LAW REVIEW
leaving the doctrine in flux in the majority of jurisdictions today." Mr.
Prosser's prediction that charitable immunity would soon meet an untimely
end failed to materialize in any practical sense. 3
B. History of Charitable Immunity in Arkansas
1. The Early Cases
The doctrine of charitable immunity enjoys almost a hundred-year history
in Arkansas.54 Unlike its turbulent history found elsewhere, the doctrine in
Arkansas has remained steadfast." The Arkansas Supreme Court first
recognized the doctrine in Grissom v. Hill,56 a property suit involving a
conveyance of land to trustees for the sole benefit of a church. 7 The trustees
initially allowed the church to be used as a school with later financial
problems resulting in a mechanics lien encumbering the property.58 The land
was then sold by execution with the new purchaser disallowing any religious
activities in violation of the donor's conditions.59 The court ordered the return
of the property to the donor because the trust was created for a charitable
purpose, and allowing the sale of the property and its non-religious use
defeated the donor's charitable intent.'
Soon after, the Arkansas Supreme Court examined ajudgment rendered
to a workman injured by a blast while constructing a public library facility.6 '
52. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 35, at 1382, 1387; Barfield, supra note 48, at
1196-97.
53. See PROSSER, supra note 41. For a look at some particular state approaches in the area
of non-profit protection, see Brenda Kimery, Tort Liability ofNonprofit Corporations and Their
Volunteers, Directors, and Officers: Focus on Oklahoma, 33 TULSA L.J. 683 (1997); Martin
C. McWilliams, Jr., Charitable Immunity: Statutory Remnants in South Carolina, 8 S.C. LAW.
28 (Oct. 1996); Peter J. Whitmore, Immunities from Liability for Colorado Nonprofit
Organizations, 25 COLO. LAW. 37 (May 1996).
54. See George, 337 Ark. at 211, 987 S.W.2d at 712.
55. But see generally Canon & Jaros, supra note 33 (tracking the demise of charitable
immunity in other jurisdictions).
56. 17 Ark. 483 (1856).
57. See Grissom, 17 Ark. at 483.
58. See id. at 484.
59. See id. at 485.
60. See id. at 49 1. The court explained that allowing the trustees to involve the property
in debt and be sold defeated the purpose of the trust because under the deed's provisions, the
property could not be sold for non-religious purposes. See id. at 488. This, in essence, allowed
the trustees to escape personal liability for misusing the land by returning the land to the donors
and not allowing execution on charitable property. See id.




In Woman's Christian National Library Ass'n v. Fordyce,62 the library
association relied solely on trustees' donations to build the library which
provided free books and instructional periodicals to the community.63
However, the property was sold to satisfy the tort judgment, and
was-ironically-purchased by the injured workman. The Arkansas Supreme
Court, building on Grissom, held that trustees may not defeat the intent of a
trust by default through the use of funds for other purposes, particularly to pay
judgments."M The court therefore refused to enforce the execution and sale,
leaving title with the original trustees.65
2. The Early Policy Rationale Behind Immunity
The Arkansas Supreme Court further solidified the doctrine on a
subsequent appeal in Fordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian National
Library Ass 'n' when it declared the property of a charity immune from sale
under execution based on the impropriety of its agents or trustees.67
Charitable immunity was justified by examining the history of charitable
immunity in England and in other jurisdictions as well as reiterating the
general policy rationale of preserving the public good.6 The court specifically
affirmed the propriety of Grissom and refused to reverse its prior holding
proclaiming charitable immunity a valid rule of property.69
62. 73 Ark. 625, 86 S.W. 417 (1904).
63. See id., 86 S.W. at 418.
64. See id., 86 S.W. at 419.
65.. See id., 86 S.W. at 419. The court did not review thejudgment of liability because that
issue was not appealed. See id., 86 S.W. at 419 (Hill, J., opinion on rehearing).
66. 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155 (1906).
67. See Fordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 559,
96 S.W. 155, 159 (1906).
68. See Fordyce, 79 Ark. at 568-70, 96 S.W. at 162-63.
69. See id. at 570, 96 S.W. at 163. The court explained that the policy change should be
made by the legislature, if at all. See id., 96 S.W. at 163. Observing the latest trends, the court
noted the legislature had expanded its protection of charities by giving them tax-exempt status.
See id., 96 S.W. at 163. The court soon after declared the building and property of the hospital
Sisters of Mercy of Female Academy exempt from taxes under the Constitution. See Hot
Springs Sch. Dist. v. Sisters of Mercy, 84 Ark. 497, 106 S.W. 954 (1907). For later treatments
of tax exemptions for charitable organizations, see Burgess v. Four States Mem'l Hosp., 250
Ark. 485, 465 S.W.2d 693 (1971); Sebastian County Equalization Bd. v. Western Ark.
Counseling & Guidance Ctr., 296 Ark. 207, 752 S.W.2d 755 (1988); Crittenden Hosp. Ass'n
v. Bd. of Equalization, 330 Ark. 767, 958 S.W.2d 512 (1997).
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3. Charitable Immunity: The Tort Doctrine and Attempted Changes
In 1953, the court first applied the doctrine of charitable immunity as it
related to the tort of a hospital employee in Crossett Health Center v.
Croswell.7' The plaintiff sued the hospital for medical negligence when a
doctor inadvertently left an object inside her abdomen during an operation.7'
The hospital argued on appeal that it was a charitable association, and was
therefore not liable for the acts of its agents.' After affirming its commitment
to charitable immunity, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that the hospital
failed to meet the standard of a charity.73 First, the court rejected the
contention that charitable articles of incorporation alone establish immunity.7'
Applying the defense narrowly, the court also distinguished the hospital from
the library association in the Fordyce cases, citing the commercial uses of the
hospital's money as non-charitable activity that placed it outside the purview
of immunity.75
The Arkansas Supreme Court again declined to overrule the doctrine of
charitable immunity in Cabbiness v. North Little Rock,76 when a boy sustained
serious injury after diving in a city swimming pool.77 The court refused to
hold the Boys' Club liable with little discussion, noting that the legislature
must effectuate any change in the long-established immunity rule in
Arkansas.78
Charitable immunity appeared in its more modem form in the case of
Helton v. Sisters of Mercy,79 when the Arkansas Supreme Court inquired into
the intent and structure of an entity to determine if it operated as a charity.
After being injected with the wrong drug, a child plaintiff sued the hospital for
negligence, and later filed a second suit under the same facts for breach of
70. 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953).
71. See Crossett, 221 Ark. at 875, 256 S.W.2d at 548.
72. See id. at 876, 256 S.W.2d at 549.
73. See id. at 883, 256 S.W.2d at 552. Crossett Lumber Company originally established
the hospital, donating land and facilities for the project. See id. at 879-80, 256 S.W.2d at 550.
74. See id. at 882, 256 S.W.2d at 552. The articles of incorporation in Crossett stated
charitable purposes yet clearly noted the following:
[any such corporation shall have power to raise money in any manner agreed upon
in its constitution or articles of association. Such corporation shall have such
powers of suing and being sued, buying, holding and selling property, real and
personal and of otherwise carrying out the purposes and objects of their
organizations ....
Id. at 880, 256 S.W.2d at 551.
75. See id. at 883, 256 S.W.2d at 552.
76. 228 Ark. 356, 307 S.W.2d 529 (1957).
77. See Cabbiness, 228 Ark. at 363, 307 S.W.2d at 533.
78. See id., 307 S.W.2d at 533.
79. 234 Ark. 76, 351 S.W.2d 129 (1961).
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contract." The court, discussing the hospital's immune status, noted the
purpose of the hospital was indeed charitable because it accepted all patients
regardless of their ability to pay and paid no taxes.8' The court also observed
the same hospital was previously declared a charity, citing an earlier case
where the hospital was declared tax-exempt.8 2 The Helton court distinguished
Crossett, in which evidence existed that the hospital was not truly following
its established charitable purpose. 3 The court stated that a public charity is
not liable in tort, reiterating that charitable immunity, as a rule of property,
should remain unchanged by the courts."
The doctrine of charitable immunity was next brought to the Arkansas
Supreme Court by a plaintiff seeking solely to overrule the long-standing
precedent. 5 In Williams v. Jefferson HospitalAss 'n," the appellants admitted
that the hospital was a charity but urged the court to abandon the present state
of the law. 7 The appellants argued several convincing points for reversal
including the doctrine's harshness on potential plaintiffs, its abandonment by
scholars, and a policy argument that charities must not remain out of the reach
of the law. 8 After admitting the appellant's arguments were persuasive, the
court recited precedent as a major factor implicating the retention of
immunity. 9 The court also stated that appellant's arguments appeared less
convincing because Arkansas applied the doctrine narrowly." Firm in its
80. See Helton, 234 Ark. at 77, 351 S.W.2d at 129-30. The plaintiffs filed the second suit
after the hospital filed a motion to dismiss based on the defense of charitable immunity. See id.,
351 S.W.2d at 129-30. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss as to both the tort and
contract suits, and they were consolidated on appeal. See id. at 78, 351 S.W.2d at 130.
8 1. See id., 351 S.W.2d at 130. The sisters of the order receive no personal compensation
and devote their lives to charity. See id., 351 S.W.2d at 131.
82. See id., 351 S.W.2d at 130-3 1.
83. See id. at 80, 351 S.W.2d at 131.
84. See id., 351 S.W.2d at 131.
85. See Williams v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W.2d 243 (1969).
86. 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W.2d 243.
87. See Williams, 246 Ark. at 1233, 442 S.W.2d at 243.
88. See id., 442 S.W.2d at 243-44. Apparently, of concern to the court was its recent
judicial abandonment of municipal immunity, promptly met by legislation reinstating the
immunity. See id. at 1236, 442 S.W.2d at 245. The court case cited by plaintiffs that
overturned municipal immunity was Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239,429 S.W.2d 45 (1968). The
statute passed by the legislature reinstating immunity to all counties, municipalities, school
districts, and other political subdivisions of the state is found at Arkansas Code Annotated
section 21-9-301 (Michie 1997).
89. See Williams, 246 Ark. at 1235, 442 S.W.2d at 244. In support of the narrow
construction rationale, the court cited Crossett, in which the court denied immunity to a hospital
because its purpose was not purely charitable. See id., 442 S.W.2d at 244. The court
questioned how many hospitals in Arkansas would meet the charitable immunity criteria
discussed in Helton v. Sisters of Mercy, 234 Ark. 76, 351 S.W.2d 129 (1961). See Williams,
246 Ark. at 1235, 442 S.W.2d at 245.
90. See Williams, 246 Ark. at 1234, 442 S.W.2d at 244.
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stance, one year later, the court refused to even discuss the revocation of the
immunity doctrine in Arkansas, explaining that Williams was dispositive on
the issue.9'
The Williams omen refusing to overturn total immunity for charitable
organizations from torts did not deter future plaintiffs from challenging its use
as a defense. For example, the Arkansas Court of Appeals conducted a
thorough inquiry of the validity of the defense in J. W. Resort v. First
American National Bank' before deciding to deny the non-profit corporation
immunity.93 Reminiscent of the early cases, the issue in J. W. Resort examined
whether the corporation's property, which initially provided housing for the
elderly and veterans, was exempt from sale under execution of a judgment.94
The Arkansas Court of Appeals upheld a judgment against the resort for the
unlawful cutting and removal of timber from a neighbor's property.95 The
resort's articles of incorporation described it as a charity, and the resort
received charitable donations; however, currently the resort only rented land
for farming.' The court of appeals also pointed out that the resort provided
children with transportation to a nearby grocery store on occasion, but
performed no other charitable acts as its purpose indicated.97 The court denied
the defendant immunity because the corporation was not maintained
exclusively as a charity and had not supplied any charitable services in over
five years.9"
91. See LeMay v. Trinity Lutheran Church, 248 Ark. 119, 120-21,450 S.W.2d 297, 297
(1970). The LeMay case involved an appeal from a judgment in favor of Trinity Lutheran
Church when a tree from the church's property fell on a neighbor's house. See id., 450 S.W.2d
at 297.
92. 3 Ark. App. 290, 291, 625 S.W.2d 557, 557 (1981).
93. See id., 625 S.W.2d at 557.
94. See id. at 290-91, 625 S.W.2d at 557.
95. See id. at 291, 625 S.W.2d at 557.
96. See id., 625 S.W.2d at 557.
97. See id., 625 S.W.2d at 557.
98. See J. W. Resort, 3 Ark. App. at 292-93, 625 S.W.2d at 558. The court cited Crossett
Health Center for the proposition that an entity must be maintained for a purely charitable
purpose to qualify for immunity. See id. at 292, 625 S.W.2d at 558. Charities in Arkansas
receive other benefits as well. For example, in an intriguing twist on charitable immunity, the
Arkansas Court of Appeals, four years after J W. Resort, held that a charitable hospital is
immune from liability for worker's compensation benefits, citing language similar to that used
to exempt a charity from tort liability. See Marion Hosp. Ass'n v. Lanphier, 15 Ark. App. 14,
15-16,688 S.W.2d 322,323(1985). The appeals court also held an ambulance service immune
from workman's compensation liability in Sloan v. Volunteer Ambulance Serv., 37 Ark. App.
138, 826 S.W.2d 296 (1992).
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4. A Test Emerges-Masterson v. Stambuck and Its Progeny
The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that no guidance existed for
determining charitable status, and in Masterson v. Stambuck,9 adopted an
eight-part test to decide the issue."° The Masterson test incorporated earlier
considerations such as the charter's indication of a charitable purpose and
whether the entity offered free services to those unable to pay, as well as new
factors regarding the financial organization of the entity.'" The court never
denoted that the adoption of these factors changed the law regarding charitable
immunity." 2 These new factors, discussed in depth in part IV of this note,
examine several issues including the following: the organization's charter
purpose, whether it is non-profit, whether it realistically earned a profit, how
that profit or surplus is used, whether the entity depends on donations,
whether it charges those who can not pay, and if its officers receive compensa-
tion.0 3
The Masterson case involved a garbage truck driver killed in an auto
accident when he struck an electric utility pole operated by Conway Corpora-
tion."° The utility franchise claimed immunity based on its charitable
status. 05 The court, applying the new test, concluded charitable immunity did
99. 321 Ark. 391, 902 S.W.2d 803 (1995).
100. See Masterson, 321 Ark. at 401, 902 S.W.2d at 809.
101. See id., 902 S.W.2d at 809. These factors were originally set forth in a Virginia district
court case, Davidson v. Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 817 F. Supp. 611, 614 (E.D. Va.
1993). See Masterson, 321 Ark. at 401, 902 S.W.2d at 809.
102. See Masterson, 321 Ark. at 401,902 S.W.2d at 810.
103. See id., 902 S.W.2d at 809. The Arkansas Court ofAppeals in Marion Hospital Ass 'n
v. Lamphier used an analogous test for hospitals that examined the following: (1) do the articles
of incorporation provide the hospital is charitable in nature; (2) is the corporation maintained
for private gain or profit; (3) does the hospital have capital stock or does it have provisions for
distributing dividends or using profits; (4) does the hospital derive funds from public and
private charity as well as those able to pay; (5) do all "profits" go toward maintaining the
hospital and extending the charity; (6) is the hospital open to those unable to pay; (7) are
patients unable to pay received without charge and absent discrimination; and (8) is the hospital
exempt from federal and state taxes. See Marion, 15 Ark. App. at 14, 688 S.W.2d at 322
(1985). The Masterson court cited this test for charitable hospitals in a footnote but did not
explain why it adopted a different test. See Masterson, 321 Ark. at 401,902 S.W.2d at 809 n.2.
This apparently caused some confusion as to whether hospitals were judged by the court of
appeals test instead of Masterson, causing the Eighth Circuit to remand a malpractice action
using the court of appeals factors instead of the Masterson test since it involved a hospital. See
Roberts v. Francis, 128 F.3d 647, 651-52 (8th Cir. 1997).
104. See Masterson, 321 Ark. at 393-94, 902 S.W.2d at 805.
105. See id. at 400, 902 S.W.2d at 809. Conway Corporation also argued governmental
immunity based on its agency as an arm of the city of Conway. See id. at 395, 902 S.W.2d at
806. The court reversed, denying municipal immunity and explaining Conway Corporation's
agency relationship with the city fell outside the language of Arkansas Code Annotated section
21-9-301. See id. at 398, 902 S.W.2d at 808.
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not apply and upheld summary judgment for the plaintiffs."° Specifically, the
court found that Conway Corporation failed to meet charitable status under
three factors: (1) its articles of incorporation did not limit it to non-profit
uses, (2) it made a substantial profit, (3) and it refused to supply utilities to
those unable to pay. 7
Soon thereafter, the court denied immunity status to ajuvenile rehabilita-
tion camp based on the Masterson test in Ouchita Wilderness Institute v.
Mergen.'0 The court reasoned that because the charter did not limit the
corporation to charitable purposes and because the camp was state-funded,
immunity was inapplicable."° The court also noted that the camp's profit
goals seemed indefinite because it returned any surplus to the state and
received no contributions otherwise."' The court next applied the Masterson
factors in George v. Jefferson Hospital Ass 'n where the plaintiff launched a
vigorous challenge to the charitable immunity defense of JRMC."
IV. REASONING OF THECOURT
In George v. Jefferson Hospital Ass 'n,"' the Arkansas Supreme Court
reviewed the trial court's issuance of summary judgment for Jefferson
Hospital Association and St. Paul Insurance Company against the plaintiff,
Ms. George." 3  The court first examined if summary judgment was
106. See id. at 403, 902 S.W.2d at 811.
107. See id. at 402-03, 902 S.W.2d at 810. Justice Brown, also the dissenter in George
wrote a dissent in Masterson disagreeing with the denial of municipal immunity to Conway
Corporation and criticizing the majority for applying statutory immunity too narrowly. See id.,
902 S.W.2d at 811 (Brown, J., dissenting). Butsee George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n,, 337 Ark.
at 217, 987 S.W.2d at 716 (Brown, J., dissenting) (writing a dissenting opinion because the
majority applied charitable immunity too broadly denying the plaintiff relief).
108. 329 Ark. 405, 418, 947 S.W.2d 780, 787 (1997).
109. See Mergen, 329 Ark. at 418, 947 S.W.2d at 787.
110. See id., 947 S.W.2d at 787. Arkansas also places another barrier to tort recovery from
hospitals due to the negligence of their physicians based on agency. See, e.g., Kenning v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 990 F. Supp. 1104 (W.D. Ark. 1997). Although the case law
remains somewhat murky, apparently a doctor may not be an agent or employee of a charitable
corporation. See Kenning, 990 F. Supp. at 1113. But see Medi-Stat Inc. v. Kusturin, 303 Ark.
45, 792 S.W.2d 869 (1990) (holding a for-profit corporation may be held liable for the
negligence of its physician employees). The court specifically declined to extend the Medi-Stat
principle to non-profit corporations in'Thomas v. Sessions, 307 Ark. 203,211, 818 S.W.2d 940,
944 (1991). For an excellent background on agency principles and physician employees in
Arkansas, see H. Ward Classen, Hospital Liabilityfor Independent Contractors: Where Do We
Go From Here?, 40 ARK. L. REV. 469 (1987).
111. See generally George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999).
112. 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999). The majority decision was authored by Justice
Lavenski R. Smith. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 710.
113. See id. at 210, 987 S.W.2d at 712.
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appropriate for deciding the status of JRMC as a tort-immune charity under
Arkansas law." 4 Next, it discussed if the trial court erred by issuing a second
summary judgment in response to the defendant's relation-back claim on the
statute of limitations." 5 This second summaryjudgment decision disallowed
plaintiff's amended suit against St. Paul, JRMC's malpractice insurance
carrier. "'
A. Doctrine of Charitable Immunity
The Arkansas Supreme Court began its substantive discussion by stating
that the doctrine of charitable immunity has enjoyed an almost hundred year
history in Arkansas." 7 The policy rationale behind the defense of charitable
immunity, according to the court, is to protect charities from financial disaster
by disallowing the execution ofjudgments against them due to the negligent
acts of their agents."' The court observed that the doctrine obviously favors
charities and limits their liability to those whom they serve."' To reduce this
pro-defendant bias, the court stated that it construes charitable immunity very
narrowly. 20 The court then cautioned that a narrow construction wouldnot
preclude the use of charitable immunity as a defense when it is clearly
applicable.'2 '
The court then enumerated the eight-factor test from Masterson v.
Stambuck' which determines if charitable immunity is applicable to a
particular organization.'23 The court, reviewing its recent treatment of the
Masterson test, noted the eight factors are illustrative and are not an exclusive
114. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 712. Arkansas is one of the few remaining states which retains
the defense of full charitable immunity for non-profit entities. See id. at 217, 987 S.W.2d at 716
(Brown, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 216, 987 S.W.2d at 714.
116. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714. The appellant amended its complaint by adding St. Paul
as a party in January 1998. See id. at 215, 987 S.W.2d at 714. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. is the medical malpractice carrier for JRMC. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
117. See id. at 211, 987 S.W.2d at 712. The earliest case cited by the court in favor of
charitable immunity was Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark. 483 (1856).
118. See George, 337 Ark. at21l,987 S.W.2d at 712.
119. Seeid.,987 S.W.2dat712.
120. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 712. See also Williams v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 246 Ark.
1231, 442 S.W.2d 243 (1969). Interestingly, the court noted in Williams that the finding of
charitable immunity for JRMC was binding only for that particular case. See Williams, 246 Ark.
at 1237, 442 S.W.2d at 245 n.1.
121. See George, 337 Ark. at2ll,987 S.W.2dat713.
122. 321 Ark. 391,401,902 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1995).
123. See George, 337 Ark. at 212, 987 S.W.2d at 713. See also supra text accompanying
note 101 (origin of the Masterson eight-part test).
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or final determination of charitable status.'24 The court then proceeded to
recite the eight factors as including the following: (1) whether the organiza-
tion's charter purpose confines it to charitable purposes; (2) whether the
organization's charter contains any not-for-profit language; (3) whether the
organization's goal is profit-making; (4) whether the organization actually
earned a profit; (5) how any profit or surplus is used; (6) whether the
organization depends on contributions for its financing; (7) whether the
organization provides service for those unable to pay; and (8) whether the
officers receive compensation or are volunteers.
2 5
In reviewing the lower court's application of these factors, the Arkansas
Supreme Court noted that the first three factors were clearly demonstrated
based upon the evidence in the record. 26 The court quickly disposed of the
first two factors, indicating the organization's charter clearly contained both
charitable and not-for-profit language.127 Also, the court concluded the
evidence showed JRMC treated patients free of charge who were unable to
pay.1
28
Before examining the remaining factors, the court dismissed Ms.
George's argument that these were questions of fact for a trial by stating these
were only differing legal constructions of undisputed facts.2 9 The court
explained that in such a case, an appellate court should affirm summary
judgment where reasonable persons could not draw varying conclusions based
upon those undisputed facts. 3°
The court analyzed the factors involving the profit-making status of
JRMC.'3 It concluded that although JRMC seeks a yearly surplus, this fact
alone is not incompatible with its claim for charitable status.3 2 Comparing
JRMC with for-profit hospitals, the court noted that JRMC's annual profit of
124. See George, 337 Ark. at 212, 987 S.W.2d at 713. See also Ouchita Wilderness Inst.
v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405, 947 S.W.2d 780 (1997).
125. See George, 337 Ark. at 212, 987 S.W.2d at 713.
126. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 713.
127. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 713.
128. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 713. The court accepted the defendant's evidence that JRMC
treated those unable to pay, and discounted Ms. George's argument that the poverty write-off
program did not exist prior to its recent formalization in 1996. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 713.
According to plaintiffs, in 1994, at the time of the action, JRMC "did not have an objective
criteria in place to determine which patients would [qualify] as charitable ... but it was a
[subjective] ... determination of the business manager of the collection agency after payment
collection efforts were attempted and failed." Brief of Appellant at 98, George (No. 98-1134).
129. See George, 337 Ark. at 211,987 S.W.2d at 712.
130. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 712.
131. See id. at212, 987 S.W.2dat713.
132. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 713. The court noted that "trying to break even is only one
factor and certainly is not a dispositive one when applied to a hospital" because of the complex
and expensive nature of the entity. Id., 987 S.W.2d at 713.
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5% fell clearly below the margin of for-profit hospitals that maintain profit
margins of 15% to 20%.' 3
After comparing JRMC's annual profit with for-profit hospitals, the court
investigated how any surplus or profit was used.'34 The court held that based
on the record, JRMC used its surplus to further its charitable purposes by
reinfusing surplus funds into the hospital.'35 The court briefly discussed
JRMC's ownership of several for-profit entities whose dividends fund the
hospital.'36 These profits, according to the court, were also used in furthering
JRMC's charitable purpose of providing quality health care and did not
destroy its charitable status.'
The court then discussed JRMC's dependency on donations for its
livelihood.3 The court stated that although JRMC only receives 6% of its
budget from donations, a large hospital could rarely survive from donations
alone.'39 In summary, the court commented that the overall structure of
JRMC's finances and organization did not dilute its overall purpose as a
charity. 40
Finally, the court discussed the compensation of the directors and officers
of JRMC. 4' The court noted that the Chief Executive Officer of JRMC
received $225,000 per year, plus bonuses depending upon surplus, with
similar compensation given to the Chief Financial Officer and others. 42
133. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 713. The court also cited a 1961 case, Helton v. Sisters of
Mercy ofSt. Joseph's Hospital, 234 Ark. 76,351 S.W.2d 129 (1961), in which a hospital made
an annual profit of $600,000 and was still deemed to be a charity. See George, 337 Ark. at 212,
987 S.W.2d at 714. JRMC, incidentally, retained a five-year surplus of over 5 million dollars.
See id. at 217, 987 S.W.2d at 715 (Brown, J., dissenting).
134. See George, 337 Ark. at 213, 987 S.W.2d at 714.
135. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
136. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
137. See id. at 213,987 S.W.2d at 714. JRMC has ownership interests in several companies
including Davis Life Care, a long-term care facility, Jefferson Management Services, a
collection agency and physician management company, Jefferson Regional Medical Center
Development, a manager of office lease space, and Jefferson Health Affiliates, a diagnostic
imaging service. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714. JRMC is the sole-stockholder in all of the
corporations except the Arkansas Preferred Provider Organization, in which it owns 50%. See
Brief for Appellee at 12,*George (No. 98-1134). The other 50% is owned by physicians in the
area and benefits the doctors to help bring in patients who may be admitted to JRMC. See id.
JRMC is also a member of Premiere, Inc., a group purchasing alliance, which buys supplies for
the hospital. See Brief for the Appellant at 38, George, (No. 98-1134). According to the CEO
of the Jefferson Hospital Association, Robert Atkinson, Jefferson invested $31,900 in Premier
Inc., which was exchanged for SunHealth stock. See id.
138. See George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714.
139. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
140. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
141. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
142. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714. The Chief Financial Officer's reported salary is $170,000
per year plus bonus, depending on surplus. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
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However, it found that minimal bonus compensation did not push JRMC into
the status of for-profit.'43 The court reasoned that a sizable hospital must pay
a competitive rate for essential personnel, and, accordingly, it is unnecessary
for a charity to maintain exclusively volunteer personnel.'"
In summary, the court concluded upon a review of all the facts that
JRMC qualified as a charity under Arkansas law and could assert the defense
of charitable immunity. 4 The court, admitting that such a result could be
harsh, instructed injured parties to sue the insurance carrier directly as allowed
under Arkansas Code Annotated section 23-79-210. "*
The dissenting opinion also examined the application of the Masterson
test to the facts. 47 Justice Brown's dissent criticized the majority's failure to
discuss how any of the facts affected JRMC's status. 48 In particular, the
dissenting opinion pointed out how the ownership of several for-profit entities
and the lack of charitable guidelines seriously undermined JRMC's status as
a charity. 49 Another problem, according to Justice Brown, was the amount
of charitable care offered at the hospital, which only comprised approximately
10% of its total clientele. 5 Justice Brown also questioned the amount of
profit made by JRMC as being in accord with its claim of charitable status.' 5'
Additionally, Justice Brown raised questions regarding whether JRMC
provided write-offs for the differential between Medicaid benefits and actual
143. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714. The court offered no real explanation for why this system
was considered "minimal" bonus compensation or what amount might sway the factor in favor
of negating immunity. Id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
144. See George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714.
145. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714. The court also stated "fair-minded persons presented with
the same facts would reach the same conclusion." Id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
146. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714. The statute states:
[W]hen liability insurance is carried by any cooperative nonprofit corporation...
not subject to suit for tort, and if any person... suffers injury or damage to person
or property on account of negligence... of the organization .... its servants, [or]
agents ... then the person so injured or damaged shall have a direct cause of action
against the insured to the extent of the amounts provided for in the insurance
policy ....
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210(a)(1) (Michie 1997). It is important to note that the statute limits
recovery to the amount "ordinarily [to] be paid under the terms of the policy." Id.
147. See George, 337 Ark. at 217, 987 S.W.2d at 715 (Brown, J., dissenting).
148. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 715 (Brown, J., dissenting).
149. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 715 (Brown, J., dissenting).
150. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 715. See also Brief for Appellant at 43, George (No. 98-1134).
151. See George, 337 Ark. at 217, 987 S.W.2d at 715. For support, Justice Brown quoted
the language from another hospital charity case, Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, which
states "[b]ut in the case at bar there are factors sufficient for the jury to find that the medical
center was not a trust involving dedication of its property to the public." Crossett Health Ctr.
v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 883, 256 S.W.2d 548, 552 (1953).
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cost of care and if the write-offs qualified as bad debts or were included in
charity totals.'
Justice Brown stressed that several fact questions existed that affected the
hospital's qualification as a charity.' He strongly criticized the majority's
focus on the fact that JRMC paid no dividends and was not a stockholder
corporation. 54 Additionally, he noted that the majority's approach abandoned
the Williams mandate of narrow construction for the defense of charitable
immunity and therefore broadened the defense by refusing to narrowly apply
the Masterson factors."'5 The dissent, citing the myriad of factual issues in the
case, concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate and that the
majority should have remanded the case for trial. 56
B. Relation-Back and the Statute of Limitations
The Arkansas Supreme Court also reviewed the circuit court's holding
that the claim against St. Paul did not relate-back to the original complaint
under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) and accordingly was barred by
the statute of limitations.5 The court found that the district court correctly
decided the issue and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company.'
The court stated that four components are required to use Rule 1 5(c)'s
relation-back provision: (1) the claim must arise out of conduct set forth in
the original pleading; (2) St. Paul must have notice of the action so as not to
be prejudiced in its defense; (3) St. Paul must or should have known but for
a mistake concerning the identity of the party, it would have been a defendant;
and (4) both requirements for subsections two and three must be met within
120 days from the date of the original complaint.159 The court conceded that
Ms. George readily proved the first and second requirements under the
Rule. 1" The court then stated that Ms. George had failed to establish that St.
Paul knew that her failure to include it as a party was a mistake of identity.'6 '
152. See George, 337 Ark. at 218, 987 S.W.2d at 716 (Brown, J., dissenting).
153. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 716 (Brown, J., dissenting).
154. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 716 (Brown, J., dissenting). Justice Brown indicated the
majority only paid lip service to the Masterson factors and broadened the doctrine of charitable
immunity by concluding no factual questions existed in a case "fraught" with fact questions.
See id., 987 S.W.2d at 716 (Brown, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 218, 987 S.W.2d at 716 (Brown, J., dissenting).
156. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 716 (Brown, J., dissenting).
157. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 716.
158. See George, 337 Ark. at 215, 987 S.W.2d at 715.
159. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 715.
160. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 715.
161. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 715.
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Ms. George argued that she believed suing St. Paul prior to a decision
regarding charitable status of the hospital might have resulted in both parties
being dismissed. 162  The court quickly disposed of this argument and
concluded that no mistake of identity was made but that plaintiff made a
purposeful calculation as to choice of parties. 63 Accordingly, the court
upheld the trial court's decision and affirmed the summary judgment
dismissing St. Paul from the case.'
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The most significant aspect of the George opinion is the application of
the Masterson charitable immunity factors for the first time to a hospital. This
decision should continue to guide future malpractice suits in Arkansas when
the defense of charitable immunity is raised.
First, the court clearly adheres to the distinct minority position of full
charitable immunity for hospitals and their staffs.'65 As mentioned, most
scholars and jurisdictions have long since placed the doctrine in retreat.
66
This is largely based on the notion that the rationale for immunity no longer
exists, and full immunity for hospitals is an ineffective allocation of tort
risk.
167
Second, George clearly indicates the new Masterson eight-part test for
the immunity defense is applicable to hospitals and may be decided on
summary judgment. 6  At first glance, the application greatly clarifies the
defense. George specifically indicates what factors the court will consider in
the charitable immunity inquiry, and that these factors are applicable to all
types of charitable organizations assertingthe defense. 69 Importantly, George
illustrates what individual weaknesses a plaintiff may argue to defeat the
immunity defense.
Third, George instructs future plaintiffs to pursue a direct remedy against
the insurance carrier under Arkansas Code Annotated section 23-79-2 10.170
162. See id. at 216, 987 S.W.2d at 715. The court dismissed her argument as "meritless"
because she could have sued both defendants and with alternative pleading experienced no
danger of a double dismissal. Id., 987 S.W.2d at 715.
163. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 715.
164. See George, 337 Ark. at 215, 987 S.W.2d at 715.
165. See id. at 217, 987 S.W.2d at 716 (Brown, J., dissenting).
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E reporter's note (1977).
167. See The Quality of Mercy, supra note 35, at 1389-90.
168. See George, 337 Ark. at 210, 987 S.W.2d at 712.
169. See id. at 212, 987 S.W.2d at 713.
170. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210 (a)(1) (Michie 1997). For the full text of the statute
see supra text accompanying note 146. The statute also does not require a hospital or other
charitable entity to carry liability insurance. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210(c)(1) (Michie
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Significantly, recovery under the statute is limited to the amount of the
insurance policy.' 7' Also, charitable hospitals are not required by law to carry
liability insurance, which may leave some plaintiffs entirely without a
remedy.'72 Without an adequate source of compensation available to them and
their attorneys, who generally work on a contingency basis, plaintiffs'
decisions to sue may be negatively affected. Such factors may also fail to
provide a real remedy to a plaintiff whose injuries exceed insurance policy
limits.
The Masterson clarification of the defense leaves the inquiry with several
problems. The court seems to have carved out a hybrid application for
hospitals. The same eight factors are used, however their application serves
as a justification for immunity rather than an application at all. The earlier
more narrow application of the Masterson test is somehow absent in
George.'73 The two previous cases decided under the Masterson factors,
which incidentally, did not involve hospitals, disallowed the defense of
charitable immunity based on two or three of the factors that indicated some
non-charitable activities.'74 In both of these instances, the court applied the
factors narrowly, and denied the defense to otherwise non-profit entities.
The George court, however, examined all the factors as they apply to
JRMC with an overriding concern for effective hospital operation.'75 The
court seemed to indicate that no one should expect a hospital to operate in the
same humble manner as other non-profits because of the complex nature of the
industry.'76 Following George, it remains difficult to reconcile how ajuvenile
rehabilitation camp does not qualify for charitable immunity but a profitable
hospital system that owns several for-profit corporations does qualify.'77 The
court seemed unconcerned with whether JRMC's profitable activities defeated
the overall charitable objectives of the hospital. 7 " It seemed so unconcerned
1997).
171. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210(a)(2) (Michie 1997).
172. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210(c)(1) (Michie 1997).
173. See George, 337 Ark. at 218, 987 S.W.2d at 716 (Brown, J., dissenting).
174. See Masterson, 321 Ark. at 402-03, 902 S.W.2d at 810; Mergen, 329 Ark. at 418,947
S.W.2d at 787.
175. See George, 337 Ark. at 213,987 S.W.2d at 713. "Modem hospitals are complex and
expensive, technological, economic, and medical enterprises that can ill afford to come short
of even in their financial integrity." Id., 987 S.W.2d at 713. "Yet, it is not necessary for
charitable organizations to have entirely volunteer staff and management. JRMC's size and
complexity make knowledgeable, well-qualified personnel essential." Id. at 214, 987 S.W.2d
at 714. "[A] modem hospital, with rare exception, would find it extremely difficult to operate
wholly or predominately on charitable organizations." Id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
176. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
177. Compare Ouchita Wilderness Inst. v. Mergen, 329 Ark. 405,947 S.W.2d 780 (1997),
with George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass 'n, 337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999).
178. See George, 337 Ark. at 214, 987 S.W.2d at 714.
1999]
UALR LAW REVIEW
in fact, that it allowed the lower court's decision to stand on summary
judgment without a thorough inquiry into the nature of the hospital system. 1
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Previously, the Williams court had indicated that few hospitals would qualify
for immunity with the narrow application given by the court."" However,
with a broader version of charitable immunity, a substantial number of
hospitals may operate within these quasi-immunity parameters.
Other practical concerns were also left unanswered. The court never
indicated how many of the eight factors a plaintiff must disprove before the
defense failed.' This is particularly problematic because the court upheld
George, a complex, fact intensive case, on summaryjudgment after discussing
the eight factors only briefly.8 2 In earlier immunity cases, any organization
that acted outside of its stated purpose was denied the charitable immunity
defense.'83 Now, two or three factors that go against a defendant may not
preclude the defense that it operates as a charity. Moreover, similar to
George, the defendant hospital may never have to prove the immunity defense
to a jury.
The exact effect of George on the charitable immunity defense for future
plaintiffs is unclear. The court may continue to apply the Masterson test
broadly to hospitals, giving them deference because of the importance of their
mission and the complexity of their operations. This may open the door for
many hospitals, formerly not charitable, to assert the defense in litigation. A
number of Arkansas hospitals operate similarly to JRMC, treating patients
who cannot pay. Also, charitable hospitals may take a cue that making a profit
and diversifying with other for-profit enterprises will not preclude them from
asserting the defense of charitable immunity in tort. As the non-profit
industry continues to grow, so will the need for a clear application of
Arkansas's full charitable immunity doctrine and a solution for the lack of
accountability it provides.'
Christa S. Clark
179. See id., 987 S.W.2d at 714.
180. See Williams, 246 Ark. at 1235, 442 S.W.2d at 245.
181. See George, 337 Ark. at 213, 987 S.W.2d at 714.
182. See supra text accompanying note 137 (discussing the various entities owned and
operated by the Jefferson Hospital Association and their profit-making status).
183. See Crossett, 221 Ark. at 880, 256 S.W.2d at 552.
184. See Quality of Mercy, supra note 35, at 1391. "[T]he victim of a tort should not
be made to bear the whole social cost of this good." Id. at 1390.
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